Il 12/06/2014 20:57, Frank leTanque ha scritto:
> OnionMail sounds interesting; I have a couple of questions that maybe
> someone could answer:
>
> 1) SSL on top of Tor, for an end to end encryption mail service. Is that
> really necessary? Maybe I misunderstand how onion routing works and/or how
> the encryption for OnionMail works?
SSL is used for these reasons:
* Verification of the server:
If an attacker get the root privileges on the server, it can read
quickly the tor
private key. An attacker can't read the server's private key.
(If server don't use -ndk option and use the F(X) start "boot" method).
* Cryptography (on Internet and Tor):
Don't forget the NTU project:
NTU is a fixed proxy to rebound the connection between internet and tor.
This is another future project to protect the exit/enter identity of
onionmail servers.
> 2) Though messages are all stored on the server in an ambiguous manner, a
> correlation attack could still be leveraged against users, correct?
> Especially since the network of people using this service is very small.
> Correlation attack based on size of message retrieved and the fact that it
> needs to be retrieved. An early video on Tor vulnerabilities:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFY615-q6Ls
> There are more recent studies. Basically, my takeaway has been that
> pluggable transports through a trusted entry node is the most secure method
> available.
To protect against data stream correlation we are working to NTU project.
For example you can activate 2 or 3 tor process and rebound connections
via NTU.
Example:
Alice ---> NTU ---> NTU ---> Bob@OnionMail ---> /dev/random --->
poisoned bait!
The dafault configuration of onionmail limits the size of the messages
to 2MB. (it can changed).
Other is all working progress...
> 3) How does this compare to Bitmessage? Security enthusiasts should really
> look into bitmessage because they will find themselves very interested in
> the concept and even the early execution. Bitmessage would have better
> metadata obfuscation, correct?
I don't use bitmessage. I'm using InterNOS, (similar to torchat + voice).
It my very old project for Android platform.
But this is another history....
OnionMail is a mail server not a p2p protocol.
It is a mail server like exim4 or postfix, but it use tor and is encrypted.
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> On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 6:58 AM, OnionMail <partecipa@???> wrote:
>
>> We are writing and translate the documentation of protocol...
>> (This is a work in progress...)
>>
>> (I am attaching in this mail the "rulez" help file).
>>
>> Sorry for ver long reply!
>>
>> OnionMail use standard SMTP and POP3 protocols.
>> OnionMail is an SMTP/POP3 mail server compatible with all mail clients.
>>
>> Main informations to know about OnionMail:
>> Inhibition of store any message in relay server.
>> Only direct connection is allowed without multiple connections-
>> Mail messages are saved only in the recipient's server and encrypted
>> with multiple asymmetric keys.
>>
>> All messages are saved into an encrypted format:
>> 7 KEYS AES 256 + 2 RSA 2048 keys + SALT. + 1 AES 256 key + SALT for each
>> message line.
>>
>> There is an RSA 2048 asymmetric key for each inbox.
>> The RSA key are encrypted by the use password.
>> There are two user's password:
>> SMTP send password. (Decrypt via HASH 7 AES256 + RSA2048 user inbox to
>> write).
>> POP3 read password. (Decrypt via HASH 7 AES256 + RSA2048 inbox to read).
>> The public key sores the message into the inbox.
>> The private key reads the messages.
>>
>> An attacker can't read your message with server key.
>> All data is stored via HASH algorithm.
>> An attacker can't read metadata with server key.
>>
>> All files are name into alphanumeric hash name.
>> An attacker can't associate a single file to any user.
>>
>> The server's master key can't used to decrypt the users account and read
>> the messages (without username, and all passwords).
>>
>> All server are forced to use SSL (in tor network).
>>
>> The server's master key is not on the server.
>> When an OnionMail server start it do the "boot" process:
>> The server negotiates a function F(X) to another server (for each server).
>> All F(X) have a counter (OTP counter) controlled by the KCTL
>> autodestruciton certificate.
>> The administrator of an OnionMail server, can enable or disable the key
>> without connect to the server.
>> The server's master keys is calculated via some F(X) and server random
>> data.
>> The F(X) can't used to get the server's master key.
>> The server don't know the F(X).
>>
>> Example:
>> The server is stolen or seized.
>> The administrator sends the KCTL certificate for autodestruction, all F(X)
>> are destroyed and the server become unusable.
>>
>> All connection between user and server are via tor network using STARTTLS.
>> The server use POP3 to force the user to read and delete the messages from
>> server. The unreaded messages are deleted after 60 days.
>>
>> All files are deleted by wipe.
>>
>> The server supports natively mailing list. (the temp files is encrypted
>> via AES256 KEY +1 KEY + SALT for each message line).
>>
>> There are some exit/enter server:
>> These servers connect internet to tor and tor to internet.
>> There is a protocol named VMAT to use normal mail address (without 16
>> characters onion address).
>>
>> There are some extended functions accessible via server's bot:
>> Server's help.
>> User configurations.
>> Personal SPAM list (to block spam messages).
>> VMAT Address verification.
>> USER SUBSCRIBE.
>> Mailing list.
>> VMAT address configuration.
>> Etc...
>>
>> The server can use GPG messages to communicate with the users.
>> For example you can create a mailing list sending to the server an
>> encrypted message. The you receive an encrypted message (use MYKEY command
>> first).
>>
>> All OnionMail server are federate and servers check each other.
>> When the SSL engine check the certificates:
>> Check HASH.
>> Check Public key (full data).
>> Check Date & time.
>> In the future we will implements the check via other servers.
>>
>> The sender is verified via TKIM (similar to DKIM but is used in tor
>> network), reading MX record (via exit node, not directly or via federation
>> server list), SMTP session simulation (mail from... tcpt to... rset... ).
>> The VMAT address is verified by RSA signature, TORM VMAT LOOKUP SMTP
>> extension.
>>
>> The administrator of an OnionMail server can't read your message and can't
>> know what are the user on the server.
>> The Administrator can creates a voucher code to use to users subscription.
>> (In this way the Administrator can know the user identity).
>>
>> onion.py
>> This script is a wizard to register a new OnionMail's account.
>> It configure quickly and simply:
>> Choose the hidden service.
>> Create a new OnionMail user.
>> Activate a new VMAT address (to use without 16 characters).
>> Create a new GPG key pair up to 16384 bits.
>> Configure Claws-Mail (account, SSL, inbox).
>> It simply extract a skel file into the claws-mail directory (if not
>> exists) ad add an inbox. Then configure account (accountrc file), and SSL
>> certificates of OnionMail server (certs directory).
>> The user is registered via RQUS extension of POP3. (OnionMail's extension
>> to use subscription method via tablet, smartphone and PC).
>> The script shows a captcha code in ASCIIart.
>>
>> There are some extensions of SMTP protocol used only by OnionMail.
>> TORM and TKIM
>> TKIM is an extension that implements a server authentication like DKIM.
>> TORM is the main onionmail's extension. Here I list only some of the
>> descriptions:
>> TORM PUSH Negotiate a F(X)
>> TORM DERK Calculate a F(X)
>> TORM VMAT LOOKUP Verify VMAT address.
>> TORM IAM I'AM (user by OnionMail manifest and federation list).
>> TORM WHO Used to verify another SSL certificate.
>> TORM VMAT TO Used to send message to VMAT user alias.
>> TORM K Get the RSA public key of this server.
>> TORM MX Query DNS MX record (only exit server).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Il 12/06/2014 12:40, William Waites ha scritto:
>>
>> Hi Anopticon,
>>
>> I've looked a little bit at OnionMail -- I'm also interested in the
>> general problem. But I have difficulty understanding exactly how it
>> works. From an end-user perspective it is reasonably clear but the
>> operation of the server software doesn't seem to be very well
>> explained. For my part (I have nothing to do with the Tails project
>> other than as a user) I wouldn't be comfortable using it or
>> recommending it without properly understanding what it does. Do you
>> have anything that is more like protocol documentation that describes
>> exactly what the servers do and how they communicate amongst each other?
>> My apologies if it is there and I simply haven't been able to find it.
>>
>> Best,
>> -w
>>
>>
>>
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