sajolida@???:
> Mathieu Gauthier-Pilote wrote:
>>> I also understand that people won't be able to create a persistent
>>> volume on this USB stick. Which is a very popular feature of Tails,
>>> and pretty much needed if you want to do serious stuff with it.
>>
>>> See https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/.
>>
>> I presume people will be free to follow these instructions for their
>> own copy of the key. I did not try it myself though.
>
> No, you can only create a persistent volume on a USB stick created using
> Tails Installer. So that won't be possible for your users. I believe
> that this is a serious usability limitation for using Tails.
Maybe, that could be resolved by telling the user to boot from the Tails
instance on the FACIL key and install Tails via Tails installer to
another USB key.
However, this does not resolve the authenticity verification issue
sajolida mentions below:
>
>>> All in all, I think that you should make it clear on your product
>>> that the version of Tails included should only be used for testing
>>> and educational purpose but shouldn't be relied upon for security.
>>
>> In the case of TAILS, ultimately, what we can instruct people to do if
>> they are serious about their security is to remove TAILS from the
>> FACIL key using MultiSystem and redo the whole process of a)
>> downloading the TAILS ISO, b) verifying it, and c) putting it
>> themselves on their own key (using MultiSystem or some other means).
>
> That would be great.
>
>> There is of course the issue of shipping the key by mail... We don't
>> have a solution for that one yet.
>
> I don't think that shipping the key by mail is more problematic that
> buying the key online in term of authenticity of the software. So if
> your users want to be able to trust Tails for serious stuff they will
> have to reinstall it anyway.
>
>
>
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