>> I havent tested using virtual tails from the same mechanical optical >> disk
>> yet.
>
> Me neither. But as long as the host has booted completely, there
> shouldn't be much competition between the host and guest to read from
> the media.
Agreed.
>> (1) User wants an entire $any VM to be torified, this VM is not
>> necessarily tails. They load they VM and the entire VM is torified
>> through
>> one socks port. Then they can run their $random windows app
>>
>>
>> (2) Tails livecd IS the guest VM. Existing apps have exactly the same
>> stream isolation because the tails guest apps are preconfigured to
>> connect
>> to vboxguest.hostadapter.ip:socksport
>>
>> This does seem like alot of work, getting all the DNS reconfigured,
>> virtual tails does look like it has alot of issues to be ironed out
>
> I'm not sure it has to be so complicated. In the Tails guest
> ('app-guest' in my "design" below) we could use firewall rules to
> redirect all traffic to the relevant local ports to the corresponding
> ports on the Tails host (or 'tor-guest'). Or set up `socat` instances
> that listens on e.g. port 9050 in the guest and forward them to port
> 9050 on the host (or 'tor-guest'). We could even write a short script
> that runs in the Tails guest ('app-guest') and scans torrc for all
> *Port:s and sets up the redirection accordingly.
>
> Any sort of re-configuration is easy as long as it's Tails we're dealing
> with. But for an arbitrary OS the best we can do is to Torify the whole
> VM from the Tails host.
Agreed.
If a tails ISO detects a DMI field system.productname =
"tails-app-guest-vm" at the syslinux stage, it could run custom scripts to
setup what you described
What is the appropriate way of doing this? Is it runlevels?
I notice not all tails custom configuration scripts are currently
controlled by runlevels
This approach for guest-vm to tor-app-vm communication looks very similar
to what would be needed for physically seperated tails boxes (eg one the
tor-server, on the app guest, and one a firewall-only that only permits
traffic to the specified bridges)
Diagram:
[Tails App PC]
|
|
[Tails Tor PC (configured to use bridges)]
|
|
[Tails firewall PC, allows only traffic to specified bridges)
|
(..Internet..)
There are things like sshfs for sharing folders.
Is it worth keeping in mind that one day, someone might implement physical
separation, so while designing or implementing virtual machine isolation
we might as well make it easier for someone to implement physical
separation later?
i.e. Where appropriate/easy choose virtual machine isolation configuration
techniques that make it easier to adapt them to physical isolation later?
I dont know if this is sensible. Physical separation may end up being a
whole different beast altogether
