I'm not a fan of openpgp.js for a lot of reasons.
http://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto explains why in a much
better way than I ever could.
- alasdair
On Jul 8, 2014 3:47 PM, "Griffin Boyce" <griffin@???> wrote:
> OpenPGP.js doesn't require the user to have GPG installed on their system.
>
> Ideally, in this case, the pubkey would be already packaged within the
> extension, with only signed updates being able to overwrite it. However, I
> think to some extent this still relies on a user making an effort to verify
> the key's validity via its web of trust.
>
> best,
> Griffin
>
> On July 8, 2014 6:19:07 PM EDT, sajolida@??? wrote:
>>
>> Giorgio Maone wrote:
>>
>>> Hi everybody.
>>>
>>> The blueprint should be enough for me to start hacking a prototype together.
>>>
>>> If nobody has suggestions, I'd propose to call the extension with the
>>> catchy (!) name of "Tails Catcher".
>>>
>>> I'd just add that a future version might embed tails developer's key and
>>> perform OpenPGP authentication itself.
>>>
>>
>> I didn't put that idea on the blueprint so far, for the following reasons:
>>
>> - OpenPGP for verifying our ISO image is only stronger than SHA256 if
>> the WoT is used to build strong trust in the signing key. Otherwise, you
>> might as well get an HTTPS MitM while receiving the key, as much as
>> while receiving the hash.
>> - Our past experience with Firegpg [1] taught us that doing GPG inside
>> of a browser is usually a
>> bad idea. The same might not apply to an ISO
>> verification but I would check this very carefully before going this way.
>> - I don't know how portable it would be to do such GPG operations from
>> inside the browser. Would the user need to have GPG installed on their
>> Windows or Mac OS X? Would we ship a GPG ourselves? All those options
>> sounds scary to me :)
>>
>> Those are the reasons why I'm not convinced by that idea. We might also
>> want to further discuss the role of the OpenPGP verification in the
>> broad installation process with UX people. But anyway, that discussion
>> shouldn't block in any way the first implementation...
>>
>> [1]:
>> https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/FireGPG_susceptible_to_devastating_attacks/index.en.html
>>
>>
> --
> Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos.
>
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