Re: [Tails-dev] [RFC] Design (and prototype) for MAC spoofin…

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Szerző: intrigeri
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Címzett: The Tails public development discussion list
Tárgy: Re: [Tails-dev] [RFC] Design (and prototype) for MAC spoofing in Tails
sajolida@??? wrote (29 Oct 2013 17:19:40 GMT) :
> On 23/10/13 18:56, intrigeri wrote:
>> sajolida@??? wrote (23 Oct 2013 11:49:26 GMT) :
>>> d. I changed the checkbox into radio buttons. The implications of this
>>> option is quite different if bridges or obfuscated bridges are used:
>>> then the user might be actively trying to AvoidSuspicion and
>>> AvoidIdTails and spoofing MAC might becomes dangerous if used at home,
>>> or at work for example. So we could remove the default setting and force
>>> the user to make a decision when using bridges. What do you think?
>>
>> When they're using bridges to workaround censorship (likely the most
>> common usecase, compared to avoiding suspicion, I guess), then I don't
>> think we should force users to *not* spoof their MAC address; I'm not
>> even sure it would be reasonable to change the default setting value
>> to "don't spoof MAC". So perhaps it's a bit more complicated. I trust
>> we'll find a solution, though!


> Just to clarify. In my proposal there would be *no default value* when
> bridges are used. So the user would have to choose explicitly between
> spoof and not spoof every time. And the explanation to help her make the
> right decision would still be:


>     It is generally safer to spoof MAC addresses, but it might also
>     raise suspicion or cause network connection problems.
>     See the documentation.


OK, I see what you mean. I'm unsure, but I don't disagree. IMHO this
is not a blocker, and it certainly can wait for a later iteration of
this feature, though.

A difficulty will be to translate this state-machine in some sane way
in a GUI, which could be a great task to add to Redmine, with the "UI
design" type of work.

Cheers,
--
intrigeri
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