On Sat, 2013-10-05 at 22:17 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
> Marco Calamari wrote (05 Oct 2013 17:58:09 GMT) :
> > One doubt; a corrupted encrypted volume id a really bad thing; is
> > this feature stable from this standpoint?
>
> At least it's not documented as experimental. I suggest asking the
> cryptsetup maintainers, if you want a more authoritative answer :)
WIll check for sure
> > Truecrypt volume header have no signature, and cannot be seen in any
> > way; it is indistiguishable from binary noise.
> > Truecrypts devices looks as unformatted empty devices or partitions,
> > or noise-filles files.
>
> OK, but then GNOME Disks and Nautilus could have a way to "this is
> a TC volume, please unlock it".
Gnome disk, Nautilus and NSA, all three cannot have that.
Only possibility I see, to put some info in a persistent
file of Gnome. But just a request telling something like.
"In the past you mounted this partition as Truecrypt container;
wand to do that again? If yes, gimme password"
With no persistent properties, Nautilus may only look at all
partitions, see those with no readable header of known type,
and ask a possible mount for them.
JM2C. Marco
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