Hi,
adrelanos wrote (04 Feb 2013 20:19:24 GMT) :
> I just updated the Whonix comparison of Whonix, Tails and Tor Browser
> Bundle page. [1] Hopefully it's this time much more precise and correct
> from the beginning.
> If there is anything wrong, I'll correct it right away.
I've seen nothing terribly wrong, but a few unclear, outdated or
misleading statements.
On the Whonix fingerprint page, "Whonix is exclusively generating Tor
activity on the network" might perhaps benefit from a clarification:
doesn't Whonix send DHCP requests?
"Includes Tor Browser" in the general security comparison should be
updated for Tails.
"Network fingerprint: ISP can guess which anonymity software is being
used because of tordate": how about adding a few lines that explain
why to this web page?
In "Circumventing Proxy Obedience Design", it's not obvious to me why
"Tails in a VM" fails against "Protocol IP leak" and "vm exploit".
Also, maybe I'm nitpicking, but IMHO "vm exploit + exploit against
physically isolated Whonix-Gateway" should be marked an "non
applicable" for "Tails in a VM", rather a fail.
This has quite some amount of outdated information:
http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/FAQ/#why-dont-you-merge-with-tails-and-join-efforts
(at first glance: Using Tor Browser, Multi language support,
obfsproxy...)
Please make it clear what versions you are comparing, because it's
quite clear it will lag behind sometimes, and I'm sure you absolutely
don't want to spread wrong information forever about Tails :)
Also, the "Hidden service support" section implicitly suggests one
cannot use HS in Tails, which is wrong.
Also, please update all places that link to our "Pidgin ctcp
replies" ticket. It's been closed for a while.
Thanks for you work!
Cheers,
--
intrigeri
| GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
| OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc
