Re: [Tails-dev] Please review and merge feature/obfsproxy

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Autor: anonym
Data:  
Para: The Tails public development discussion list
Asunto: Re: [Tails-dev] Please review and merge feature/obfsproxy
22/11/12 18:26, anonym wrote:
> 13/11/12 20:25, Ague Mill wrote:
>> anonym:
>>> 12/11/12 15:11, anonym wrote:
>>>> 03/11/12 09:08, intrigeri wrote:
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> anonym wrote (02 Nov 2012 20:26:34 GMT) :
>>>>>> Basic (perhaps even experimental as it currently lacks documentation)
>>>>>> support for obfsproxy has been added in the branch feature/obfsproxy.
>>>>>> Please review and merge it into devel.
>>>>>
>>>>> We agreed at the Tails summit to not merge new features before their
>>>>> documentation is ready. For the record, this is what allows us to
>>>>> squeeze the delay before feature freeze + RC1 and RC2, because it's
>>>>> now dedicated to translation work, rather than (like we used to do) to
>>>>> doc writing + translations.
>>>>
>>>> Now done:
>>>
>>> I should perhaps have pointed out that I'd really to see this branch
>>> merged for Tails 0.15.
>>
>> Confirmed working. Merged.
>
> I've pushed some further improvements to the docs after a discussion on
> #tails. Please review and merge.


There was some concerns raised against commit bb1c08e on #tails:

    (18:35:29) velope: finally, i do not think it is an improvement
    to change 'you think you need to use bridges' into the
    recommendation 'you should use bridges'
    (18:36:16) velope: using bridges is not necessarily better, and
    users should not use them merely because they want an extra layer
    to hide more.
    (18:37:22) velope: bridges are less reliable and tend to have
    lower performance than regular guards, so a user has to actively
    keep getting and configuring them, as opposed to letting tor
    choose guards.
    [...]
    (18:50:33) velope: i really believe that circumvention and hiding
    are so different that they should not be combined in a single
    recommendation.
    (18:51:21) velope: and my concern with 'you should use bridges'
    in anything except cut-and-dry circumvention is that you're
    making a security decision for users where the facts are not
    fully understood.
    (18:52:11) velope: that is why i prefer something like 'you wish
    to use bridges', which leaves the power and responsibility
    completely with the user.
    (18:54:15) velope: of course users tend to not want full power
    and responsibility, they want a simple answer. mais c'est la vie.


What do you think? My reading of the section in question is "if Tor is
censored or dangerous, use bridges cause they make it harder for others
to see that you use Tor which helps in those situations", which seems
like a sound recommendation to me.

I just thought that this could be some food for though for whoever
reviews these doc changes.

Cheers!