著者: adrelanos 日付: To: tails-dev, tor-talk 題目: [Tails-dev] tails_htp: exit node can fingerprint Tails users until
exit node is changed
Because Tails doesn't use stream isolation and uses tails_htp over Tor,
the exit node can see "Hello, this is a Tails user!". (Who else uses
tails_htp over Tor.) The problem persists until the exit node is changed.
Proposed solution: use stream isolation, run tails_htp/wget over a
different SocksPort.
It's not a serious issue, not using Tor Browser is the much bigger
fingerprinting issue.
It depends on your goals, if you want to switch to Tor Browser some day
and share the same Tor Browser fingerprint (whatever that is), you
should probable fix it.
