16/04/11 21:12, intrigeri:
> sajolida wrote (14 Apr 2011 15:28:37 GMT) :
>
>> Vidalia's "New Identity" button forces Tor to use new circuits, thus
>> addressing the first threat
>
> Wrong. It asks Tor to use new circuits **for new connections** only.
> We've been discussing it on this mailing-list a few months ago, in the
> thread about HTTP keep-alive. Also see recent activity about such
> matters on Tor's bug tracker.
Could you please provide some links?
> In the current state of things, I think we should either not mention
> this feature of Vidalia's, or tell it can **not** be accounted on to
> address the first threat.
I've been giving this whole issue some though in two instances, a post
to or-talk discussing stricter newnym behaviour [0], and on my bug about
changing bridge behaviour [1]. Essentially, I'm considering a more
drastic approach that closes all circuits, even those handling streams.
As this is a very important issue for our users, I think we should try
thinking a bit of how we want this to work and do some lobbying on the
Tor mailing lists and bug tracker. At this point it seems that NEWNYM is
too unreliable to recommend using, or even that we should warn users
about it, which is not good. What are your thought on the subject?
Cheers!
[0]
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2011-March/019723.html
[1]
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2355#comment:13
