Re: [Tails-dev] RFC: persistent Tor state

Hi,

anonym wrote (16 Jun 2015 13:11:44 GMT) :
> On 05/21/2015 05:38 PM, sajolida wrote:
>> So would it then make sense to hash:
>>
>> hash(Tails device secret, N bits of gateway MAC, SSID)
>>
>> Of course, I'm simplifying here to Wi-Fi only as there is no notion of
>> SSID with wired connections. But you know, wire is deprecated :)

> If there's no SSID, like on wired connections, we just set a default
> SSID of the empty string or whatever.

I like this idea. sajolida, are you up to integrating it into the
blueprint, or should anonym or I do it?

>> On another topic, I found the shortcut to the 6 number a bit too quick.
>> How do you go from "between 500 and 2000 Tor relays" and "N=6 → 64
>> possible Tor states"?

> We do not really have any solid reasoning here. We need to make a
> worst-case analysis for how N affects the probability of picking
> compromised guards in a Tor network where C out of G guards are
> compromised (and in the control of our local attacker).

Yep, the goal is to pick the smallest possible N that still leaves
room for enough persistent Tor states.

Cheers!
--
intrigeri