Re: [Tails-dev] Please review and test feature/tordate

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Autor: intrigeri
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Para: The Tails public development discussion list
Temas antigos: Re: [Tails-dev] Please review and test feature/tordate
Temas novos: Re: [Tails-dev] Please review and test feature/tordate
Asunto: Re: [Tails-dev] Please review and test feature/tordate
hi,

(Let's kill this old stalled discussion, and free some mental space
of ours.)

intrigeri wrote (24 Sep 2012 10:11:59 GMT) :
> anonym wrote (06 Feb 2012 14:24:31 GMT) :
>> [...] It turned out that if we want a long, stable Tor session with
>> a time only handled by tordate (like when htpdate fails), then the
>> only really safe thing to do is to *always*, no matter what, set the
>> time to fresh-until.
>> [...]
>> **Conclusion:** The safest seems to be to set `V = N = W =
>> fresh-until`, which effectively removes "*good enough* time" check --
>> no matter what, `tordate` should make sure a consensus is fetched and
>> we should always set the time to its `fresh-until`, no more, no less.


> More than seven months have passed, and nobody has taken the time to
> verify this analysis theoretically, so I seriously doubt anyone will
> ever do that. Therefore, I propose we implement anonym's proposal,
> merge that into experimental, test it in extreme conditions, play with
> it for a while, and see what happens.


> In case we go this way, anonym, do you want to handle this?


>> This problem is partially based on Tor's extreme sensitivity to
>> clocks that are behind, for which a potential fix is discussed in
>> the end of the analysis. If you agree with my analysis I'm gonna
>> send a bug report with the relevant parts.


> Well, I suggest you do send this bug report without waiting for input
> from us any further. Tor developers will be much better than us to
> review your suggestions. Sorry not to be that helpful, the best I can
> do about that right now is: Be bold! :)


Ping?

Cheers,
--
intrigeri
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